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Abstract
If people avoid alternatives they dislike, a negative evaluative bias emerges because errors
of under-evaluation are unlikely to be corrected. Prior work that analyzed this mechanism
has shown that when the social environment exposes people to avoided alternatives (i.e. it
makes them resample them), then evaluations can become systematically more positive. In
this paper, we clarify the conditions under which this happens. By analyzing a simple
learning model, we show that whether additional exposures induced by the social
environment lead to more positive or more negative evaluations depends on how prior
evaluations and the social environment interact in driving resampling. We apply these
insights to the study of the e ect of popularity on evaluations. We show theoretically that
increased popularity leads to more positive evaluations when popularity mainly increases
the chances of resampling for individuals with low current evaluations. Data on repeat
stays at hotels are consistent with this condition: the popularity of a hotel mainly impacts
the chances of a repeat stay for individuals with low satisfaction scores. Our results
illustrate how a sampling approach can help to explain when and why people tend to like
popular alternatives. They also shed new light on the polarization of attitudes across social
groups.
Keywords: Information Sampling, Learning, Beliefs, Attitudes, Judgments, Biases,
Social Influence.
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Information Sampling, Judgment and the Environment:
Application to the E ect of Popularity on Evaluations
Introduction
How are judgments and attitudes influenced by the individuals and objects with
which people get into contact as they navigate their social world? Researchers in
psychology have explored this fundamental question using two very di erent approaches.
The first approach focuses on how the social environment a ects how people process
information about judgment targets. For example, research on priming has demonstrated
that being exposed to a particular concept makes some categories more likely to be
activated and thus a ects the inferences people make about other people (e.g., Macrae &
Bodenhausen, 2000). The second approach focuses on how the social environment a ects
the samples of information to which people are exposed. It has proposed that biases in the
samples of information can lead to biased beliefs and judgments (Einhorn, & Hogarth,
1978; Fiedler, 2000; Denrell, 2005; Smith & Collins, 2009; see Fiedler & Juslin, 2006, for a
review). Several papers in this tradition have focused on what happens when the social
environment makes an agent sample a judgment target that she would otherwise have
avoided. It has been shown this tend to lead to more positive attitudes (Denrell & Le Mens,
2007, 2011; Fazio et al., 2004; Le Mens et al., 2016). In this paper, we revisit this issue.
Why would additional exposure have a systematic e ect on attitudes, according to
the sampling approach? The key mechanism is the ‘hot stove e ect’ which leads to a
negativity bias in evaluations when people learn from experience (Denrell & March, 2001).
It works as follows: People are likely to resample options with which they have had positive
experiences. This implies that errors of overestimation are likely to be corrected. When
people have a negative experience with an option, however, they are unlikely to resample.
This implies that errors of underestimation are unlikely to be corrected. Denrell and March
(2001) named this asymmetry in error corrections the ‘hot stove e ect’ in deference to Mark
Twain’s observation about the cat and the hot stove: “We should be careful to get out of
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an experience only the wisdom that is in it –and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits
down on a hot stove lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove lid again – and that is well;
but also she will never sit down on a cold one.” (Twain 1897, p. 124). An important
consequence of the hot stove e ect is that exposure to an avoided alternative can have a
systematic e ect on evaluations of this alternative. Such exposure can change an agent’s
evaluation from negative to positive; a change that would not have happened otherwise.
In this paper, we demonstrate that additional exposure to avoided alternatives does
not always have a positive e ect on evaluation. Under some conditions, additional
exposure can have a systematic negative e ect on evaluations. We also specify su cient
conditions for the emergence of the positive e ect of additional exposure on evaluations.
This helps delineate the domain of application of the claims about the e ect of additional
exposure made in earlier work.
We analyze a model in which information sampling is shaped by current evaluations
(people are more likely to sample alternatives they like) but also influenced by the social
environment. For example, people may be more likely to be exposed to (and thus sample)
alternatives that are popular (i.e., frequently chosen or liked by others). Using a more
general theoretical formulation compared to prior work, we show that whether the e ect of
exposure on evaluations is positive or negative depends how current evaluations and
popularity interact in driving exposure. For example, if popularity mainly increases the
chances of sampling alternatives a decision-maker dislikes, but does not change much the
chance of sampling alternatives the decision-maker likes, then higher popularity will be
associated with more positive evaluations of an alternative. If popularity mainly increases
the chances of sampling alternatives the decision-maker already likes, and does not change
much the chance of sampling disliked alternatives, then higher popularity will be associated
with more negative evaluations of an alternative.
Using a large dataset of members in a loyalty program in a large hotel chain with
more than 4,500 hotels, we estimate how current evaluations and popularity jointly impact
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the probability of resampling (operationalized as the probability of a repeat stay at a hotel
chain). Estimations show that popularity mainly increases the chances of resampling for
individuals with low satisfaction scores. Our model implies that in this case, popularity has
an indirect and positive e ect on quality estimates through its influence on sampling
behavior. The sampling mechanism we propose could thus contribute to explaining why
people like more popular hotels better than less popular hotels.
At a theoretical level, we also explore the consequences of our mechanism for
explaining the polarization of attitudes across social groups. More generally, our model and
data illustrate how a sampling-based approach can help understand how features of the
social environment, such as popularity, impact evaluations and judgments. Simon (1955)
stressed that judgments are outcomes of cognitive operations on information samples
obtained from the environment. While existing explanations focus on how the mind
processes the available samples of information (the second stage), our sampling approach
emphasizes properties of the information sample on which cognitive processes operate (the
first stage).
Model
We analyze a simple computational model in which an individual learns about the
qualities of two uncertain alternatives from experience. Let Qˆ1,t (Qˆ2,t) denote the quality
estimate for Alternative 1 (Alternative 2) at the beginning of period t. The individual
updates her quality estimates on the basis of her observations of the payo s of the
alternatives. We also assume that the individual seeks positive experiences: the probability
of sampling an alternative is increasing in the decision maker’s quality estimate for that
alternative (and decreasing in her estimate for the other alternative). To model the
influence of the social environment on sampling, we introduce additional parameters. We
denote by ﬁ1 (ﬁ2) the environmental factor that pertains to Alternative 1 (Alternative 2).
For concreteness, we refer to ﬁj as the ‘popularity’ of alternative j.
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Unless otherwise noted, we use capital letters to refer to random variables and
corresponding non-capital letters to refer to their instantiations and non-random model
parameters. Our model is as follows:
Payo s of the alternatives. In each period, the decision maker samples one of
K available alternatives. The payo s of Alternative k are independent realizations of a
random variable with mean µk and positive variance ‡2. The payo  of Alternative k in
period t is denoted by Qk,t.
Quality estimates. The estimate updating rule has the following form:
Qˆk,t+1 = Qˆk,t + bt
1
Qk,t ≠ Qˆk,t
2
, (1)
where bt is the weight of new sampled information. bt is allowed to change in every period
(0 < bt < 1).
Sampling rule. The likelihood of sampling Alternative k in period t is given by
the following Luce choice rule:
pSk (qˆ1,t, ..., qˆM,t, ﬁ1, ...,ﬁM) =
– (qˆk,t, ﬁk)qM
m=1 – (qˆm,t, ﬁm)
, (2)
where – (·, ·) is a positive function increasing in both of its arguments. – (qˆk,t, ﬁk) can be
interpreted as the ‘attractiveness,’ or ‘utility’ of Alternative k.
Theoretical predictions
Let
1
Qˆ1, Qˆ2
2
denote the random variables toward which the quality estimates
converge as t becomes large. When the expected value of Qˆk, denoted E[Qˆk], increases
(decreases) in ﬁk, we say that popularity has an indirect positive (negative) e ect on
quality estimates through information sampling.
The following theorem describes the conditions under which the indirect e ect of the
social environment (popularity) on quality estimates through sampling is positive or
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negative. The sign of this indirect e ect depends on the form of the ‘utility’ function – (·, ·).
Theorem 1. Under some mild regularity conditions,1 we have, for all k:
i) If ˆ2 log–(qˆk,ﬁk)ˆﬁkˆqˆk Æ 0 then E[Qˆk] is non-decreasing in ﬁk.
ii) If
ˆ2 1
–(qˆk,ﬁk)
ˆﬁkˆqˆk
Æ 0, then E[Qˆk] is non-increasing in ﬁk.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 1 i) states a su cient condition on – (·, ·) for the e ect of popularity to be
positive. The technical condition on – (·, ·) in i) is known as ‘log-submodularity’ (Karlin &
Rinott, 1980). To better understand this condition, imagine increasing ﬁk from ﬁk,1 to ﬁk,2
and consider how this changes the ratio of sampling probabilities,
pSk(qˆk, ﬁk,2)/pSk(qˆk, ﬁk,1). According to the sampling rule (eq. 2) it is equal to
– (qˆk, ﬁk,2) /– (qˆk, ﬁk,1). The ‘log-submodularity’ condition means that this ratio either a)
increases more when qˆk is low than when qˆk is high or b) the increase is independent of qˆk.
Informally, condition i) is satisfied when the e ect of popularity on sampling is higher when
the quality estimates are low than when they are high (or independent of quality).
To illustrate the implications of this condition, consider the special case where
sampling follows a logistic choice rule. In this case, the ‘utility’ function is the exponential
of a linear function:
– (qˆk, ﬁk) = Exp(a0 + a1qˆk + a2ﬁk + a3qˆkﬁk). (3)
We assume a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 to ensure that the sampling likelihood is increasing in the
quality estimate and in popularity. In this case, we have ˆ2 log–(qˆk,ﬁk)ˆﬁkˆqˆk,t = a3 and condition i)
holds whenever a3 Æ 0. That is, whenever the value of the interaction term is negative or
zero, then condition i) is satisfied. The theorem implies that popularity has a positive
e ect on quality evaluations.
1See footnote 6 in the Appendix.
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More generally, the ‘log-submodularity’ condition can be understood as a weak
version of the condition that popularity and quality estimates are ‘substitutes’. In
economics, two goods, x and y, are called ‘substitutes’ if the cross-derivative of the utility
function, ˆ2u(x, y)/ˆxˆy, is negative. If x and y are substitutes this implies that an
increase in y increases utility more strongly when x is small than when x is large. The
‘log-submodularity’ condition requires that the logarithm of – (·, ·), has a negative
cross-derivative. This condition is weaker than substitutability because substitutability (a
negative cross-derivative) implies log-submodularity whereas log-submodularity does not
necessarily imply substitutability.2
Condition in ii) in Theorem 1 states a su cient condition for the e ect of popularity
to be negative. This condition can be understood as a strong version of ‘complementarity’.
Two goods, x and y, are complements if the cross-derivative of the utility function,
ˆ2u(x, y)/ˆxˆy, is positive. If x and y are complements this implies that an increase in y
increases utility more if x is large than if x is small. The condition in ii. (
ˆ2 1
–(qˆk,ﬁk)
ˆﬁkˆqˆk
Æ 0)
implies complementarity (ˆ2–(qˆk,ﬁk)ˆﬁkˆqˆk > 0), but not the other way around. The condition in
ii) can thus be interpreted as a ‘strong’ complementarity condition. If this condition holds,
the indirect e ect of popularity on quality estimates via sampling is not positive, but
rather negative (or, more generally, non-increasing in ﬁk).
Informally, Theorem 1 states that whether popularity has a positive or negative e ect
on quality estimates, via sampling, depends on whether an increase in popularity changes
sampling (proportionally) more when i) the quality estimate is low or when ii) the quality
estimate is high. The intuitive explanation for why this interaction matters is as follows. If
popularity increases sampling most for low quality estimates (case i), low quality estimates
have a chance to regress-to-the-mean, i.e., upward. If popularity increases sampling most
for high quality estimates (case ii), high quality estimates have a chance to
regress-to-the-mean, i.e., downward.
2Assuming the function and the first derivatives are positive.
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It is important to note that if the sampling likelihood depends just on the social
environment but not on quality estimates, the social environment has no e ect on quality
estimates. This is because there is no sampling bias in this case: at the beginning of period
t, the quality estimate for Alternative k is the weighted average of t or fewer independent
and identically distributed observations. Therefore, for all t, E[Qˆk,t] = µk.
To illustrate Theorem 1, we simulated the model in a setting with two alternatives
with normally distributed payo s (means µ1 = 2 and µ2 = 2.5 and common variance
‡2 = 4). Thus, Alternative 1 is has lower quality than Alternative 2. We assume that the
weight of new evidence in the estimate updating rule is constant and equal to b = .5.
Consider first the case where – (qˆk,t, ﬁk) = eqˆk,t+ﬁk . As we explained above, this is consistent
with condition i) in Theorem 1. In this case, average quality estimates underestimate true
qualities, E[Qˆk,t] < µk (Figure 1). This reflects the ‘hot stove e ect’ (Denrell, 2005; Fazio,
Eiser, & Shook, 2004; March, 1996). More importantly, a higher popularity reduces the
extent of underestimation. It follows that when the inferior Alternative 1 is popular (high
ﬁ1), it may be estimated to have a higher quality than the superior Alternative 2:
E[Qˆ1,t] > E[Qˆ2,t]. Indeed, the probability of mistakenly believing Alternative 1 to be the
superior alternative, P (Qˆ1,t > Qˆ2,t), can be shown to increase with ﬁ1.
Suppose, next, that condition i) in Theorem 1 does not apply. Then the e ect of
popularity is not necessarily positive, but can be negative. To illustrate when this occurs,
suppose – (qˆk,t, ﬁk) = eqˆk,t+ﬁk+2qˆk,tﬁk , implying that popularity and quality estimates are
complements. The hot-stove e ect still operates and qualities are systematically
underestimated (see Figure 2). But, in contrast to the prior setting, the impact of ﬁ1 is no
longer positive but negative: the estimated quality of Alternative 1 is lower when ﬁ1 is
large and higher when ﬁ1 is low.
To illustrate how changes in model parameters a ect the size of the e ect of the social
environment on evaluations, we derived the formula for the expected asymptotic quality
estimate for the two alternative model with normally distributed payo s. We assume the
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utility function is compensatory, consistent with case i in Theorem 1: – (qˆk,t, ﬁk) = esqˆk,t+ﬁk .
Here s characterizes the sensitivity of the choice to quality estimates. We have:
Lemma 1. The expected asymptotic quality estimate for Alternative k is given by:
E[Qˆ1] = µ1 ≠ sb2≠ b‡
2 e
≠sµ1
e≠sµ1 + eﬁ1≠ﬁ2e≠sµ2 < µ1. (4)
The same holds for Alternative 2.
Proof. See the Supplementary Material.
Just as in the simulations, the expected quality estimate E[Qˆ1] is always lower than
quality, E[Qˆ1] < µ1. The size of the underestimation decreases with the popularity of
Alternative 1 ﬁ1 (Figure 3). At the limit, if ﬁ1 ∫ ﬁ2, there is no systematic
underestimation of Alternative 1. Equation 4 indicates that the e ect of the social
environment on evaluations (the strength of underestimation) is stronger when (1) the
variance of the observations (‡2) is large, (2) the weight of new observations is large (b is
close to 1) and (3) the sensitivity of the sampling rule to quality estimates is high (s is
large) – See the Supplementary Material for additional discussion.
Application to the e ect of popularity on evaluations
In many situations people have an increased propensity to sample alternatives that
are popular (i.e., chosen by many other people) as compared to alternatives that are
unpopular (i.e., chosen by few other people). People may decide to go along with the
majority and select the more popular alternative to avoid being seen as deviant (Cialdini &
Goldstein, 2004; Granovetter, 1978), because of adverse reputation e ects from receiving a
poor outcome with an unusual alternative (Keynes, 1936), or because they know that those
who deviate from the majority opinion tend to be disliked (Gerard and Rotter, 1961). For
example, it is di cult for a doctor not to use the ‘best practice’ prevailing in her hospital
system in order to treat a given pathology, even if her personal experience with this
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practice is not positive. It is also safer to choose a popular alternative (Granovetter, 1978)
than an unusual one. For example, a researcher will find it easier to get help if he chooses a
research method commonly used by his colleagues. The advantage of having help around
may motivate him to choose this method even if he does not believe that it is superior or if
he got a poor experience with it.
Applied to this kind of setting, our model implies that people will evaluate popular
alternatives more positively than unpopular alternatives, even if there are no systematic
di erences in quality. The asymmetry in estimates emerges because errors of
underestimation are more likely remain uncorrected for unpopular alternatives than for
popular alternatives. The higher the number of periods, the higher the cumulative
probability that some errors of underestimation will have emerged and, in turn, the higher
the probability that some errors will remain uncorrected. Our explanation is thus most
relevant to explaining judgment patterns in empirical settings where people form their
attitudes on the basis of repeated experiences, such as when the attitude object is another
individual, a service, a sport or leisure activity, a musical artist, a music genre, a
restaurant, a hotel, or an investment strategy. Our model is less relevant to settings where
people have at most one or two interactions with the attitude object.
Many existing explanations for the positive e ect of popularity on quality estimates
emphasize conscious popularity-based inference. For example, the ‘information cascades’
and ‘rational herding’ literatures have shown that it is rational to use popularity as a signal
of quality (e.g., Banerjee, 1992). Our model deliberately excluded such direct inferences
from popularity to quality: we only assumed that popularity a ects re-sampling and hence
provides access to additional (unbiased but noisy) payo  information. There is an
additional di erence: The social learning explanations discussed in the information
cascades and rational herding literatures assume that people are aware of the di erence in
popularity. But our explanation still works when people are not aware of such di erence.
Another explanation for the positive e ect of popularity on evaluations focuses on the
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role of group identity: people might adjust their beliefs and attitudes to conform with the
opinion prevailing in a group because they identify with the group (Cialdini & Goldstein,
2004; Turner, 1991). The reason is that similarity of attitudes is an important driver of
interpersonal attraction (e.g., Clore, 1976). Our explanation clearly di ers from such an
identity-based mechanism because the latter consists of a direct e ect of popularity on
evaluations: the decision maker changes her attitudes when becoming aware of the
attitudes of the members of the group. By contrast, our mechanism does not rely on this
kind of motivated cognition. The influence of others remains outside the mind: it only
a ects the information people sample.
Several influential theories, such as cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), or
self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) have proposed that people adjust their judgments to
make them consistent with their behavior. Under our assumption that people are more
likely to choose popular alternatives than unpopular alternatives, these theories might also
predict that popular alternatives would be evaluated more positively than unpopular
alternatives. These theories rely on motivated cognition, whereas our model does not.
Therefore, our model is applicable in situations where these theories are unlikely to operate.
While our argument di ers from theories based on motivated cognition and
popularity-based inferences, we do not challenge the experimental evidence for these
mechanisms. Rather, our model suggests a complementary explanation that is likely to be
important in naturally occurring environments where popularity a ects available
information.
Empirical illustration
Theorem 1 shows that the sign of the indirect e ect of popularity on quality
estimates through sampling depends on how quality estimate and popularity interact in
a ecting the attractiveness of the alternative. In order to illustrate how this interaction
can be measured from field data, we analyzed a large dataset of members in a loyalty
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program in a large hotel chain with more than 4,500 hotels.
We have data on loyalty members whose first ever experience with the multi-chain
hotel group was measured through the satisfaction survey conducted by the hotel group.
This first stay took place between 2012 and 2015. The overall satisfaction with the stay is
measured on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is the worst rating and 10 is the best. We take
the satisfaction score given by the customer as her quality estimate of the hotel. Crucial
for our purpose is that the subsequent stays of members of the loyalty program are
recorded in our data. We aim to predict whether a customer will return to the same hotel
(and thus re-sample it) on the basis of her satisfaction with the first stay and the
popularity of the hotel.
More precisely, the dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates whether the
individual returned for a repeat stay at the first hotel she experienced with the multi-chain
hotel group within 180 days of the first stay. We define the popularity of a hotel as the
number of ratings it received on TripAdvisor in the 365 days preceding the first stay of the
customer. The ‘standardized popularity’ is denoted by ﬁk and refers to the popularity
divided by the standard deviation of popularity (which equals 51). Our dataset contains
455,903 individuals and 62,182 re-sampling events.
Analysis. We focus on pSik,2, the probability that user i visits hotel k within 180
days of the first stay. We assume that this probability can be expressed by a logistic choice
rule that is a function of quality estimate and popularity (consistent with eq. 2 and eq. 3).
Finally, we assume that the attractiveness of all other hotels is 1.3 In other words:
pSik,2 =
ea0,k+a1qˆ
i
k,1+a2ﬁk+a3qˆik,1ﬁk
1 + ea0,k+a1qˆik,1+a2ﬁk+a3qˆik,1ﬁk
, (5)
where qˆik,1 is the satisfaction score customer i gave to hotel after her first stay, ﬁk is the
standardized popularity of the hotel, a0,k is a hotel fixed e ect, and a1, a2 and a3 are
3It is not a problem to assume that the combined attractiveness of all other available hotels is equal to 1
because there is a scaling factor (ea0,k in the expression for the attractiveness of the focal hotel) and what
matters is the ratio of the levels of attractiveness.
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parameters to be estimated.
For this specification, in which – (qˆk, ﬁk) = Exp(a0 + a1qˆk + a2ﬁk + a3qˆikﬁk), condition
i) in Theorem 1 holds whenever a3 Æ 0. That is, a sampling approach only predicts
positive indirect e ect of popularity on quality estimates if the interaction term is negative
or zero. Is such an assumption of a non-positive interaction e ect plausible?
To find out, we fitted equation 5 to the data on hotel visits, using maximum
likelihood.4 Table 1 shows the estimated values of a1, a2, and a3. As shown, the
attractiveness of the hotel increases with the satisfaction score of the first stay (a1 > 0) and
popularity (a2 > 0. Most important, the interaction term is negative (a3 < 0).5 This
non-positive interaction e ect is consistent with the condition i) in Theorem 1, which
implies that in this setting the indirect e ect of popularity on quality estimates will be
positive. Stated di erently, the estimates show that popularity can have a positive indirect
e ect on quality estimates via its impact on sampling behavior. The upshot is that the
sampling mechanism we propose could explain why people might like more popular hotels
better than less popular hotels.
Satisfaction Score: a1 0.047*
(0.003)
Standardized Popularity: a2 0.086*
(0.026)
Satisfaction Score ◊ Popularity: a3 -0.012*
(0.002)
Observations 455,903
LR Chi-Square 264.95
Standard errors are in parentheses. ú : p < 0.001.
Table 1
E ect of satisfaction with first stay and standardized hotel popularity on likelihood to revisit
the hotel based on the estimation of eq. 5 (with hotel fixed e ects).
4We used the ‘xtlogit’ command in Stata 14.
5The estimated interaction e ect remains the same, at ≠0.013, if we remove fixed e ects. Ancillary
analyses show that other factors a ect the sampling likelihood in a similar way, such as the hotel star rating,
or the average rating on TripAdvisor.
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Implications for identity signaling and attitude polarization
Our sampling based mechanism can also contribute to explaining the polarization of
attitudes across groups. This happens when people want to avoid alternatives that are
popular in other groups. This behavior is likely when the activities people choose signal
their identities.
By choosing a particular type of clothes, hairstyle, or program of education, people
signal to others who they are (Bourdieu, 1984). The desire to signal their identity can
motivate people to engage in activities typically associated with the type of people with
whom they want to be identified (McCracken, 1988). Identity signaling also motivates
people to avoid activities associated with a group of people from whom one wants to
distance oneself (Berger & Heath, 2007). Applied to this setting, our model can provide a
novel explanation as to why individuals might shift their attitudes to diverge from the
attitudes of groups with which they do not wish to identify (Wood et al, 1996). For
example, it has been observed that educated people tend to dislike music they associate
with uneducated people (Bryson, 1996).
Suppose there are two groups (A and B, such as teenagers and parents) and two
possible activities (1 and 2). Activity 1 is popular in Group A; Activity 2 is popular in
Group B. Let ﬁA1 denote the popularity of Alternative 1 in Group A, ﬁB1 the popularity of
that alternative in Group B, etc. We have ﬁA1 ∫ ﬁB1 and ﬁA2 π ﬁB2 .
If an agent belongs to Group A, she is more likely to adopt a practice that is popular
in Group A and unpopular in Group B because she wants to be identified as a member of
Group A. More precisely, we assume that if the agent is in Group A, the likelihood that she
samples Alternative 1 in period t is:
pSA1 (qˆ1,t, qˆ2,t) =
esqˆ1,t+ﬁ
A
1 ≠ﬁB1
esqˆ1,t+ﬁ
A
1 ≠ﬁB1 + esqˆ2,t+ﬁA2 ≠ﬁB2
.
All the other elements of the model remain the same as in the baseline setting
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analyzed above. The initial estimates are unbiased: there is no systematic di erences
between the initial quality estimates of members of the two groups.
The following proposition describes the pattern of asymptotic quality estimates:
Proposition 1. Suppose Alternative 1 is much more popular in Group A than in Group B
(ﬁA1 ∫ ﬁB1 ) and that Alternative 2 is much more popular in Group B than in Group A
(ﬁA2 π ﬁB2 ), we have:
For Group A agents:
E[Qˆ1] ≥ µ1 ; E[Qˆ2] ≥ µ2 ≠ sb2≠ b‡
2.
ii) For Group B agents:
E[Qˆ1] ≥ µ1 ≠ sb2≠ b‡
2 ; E[Qˆ2] ≥ µ2.
Proof. See the Supplementary Material.
Suppose that the two alternatives have similar qualities (µ1 ≥ µ2). Our model implies
the emergence of attitude polarization: Members of Group A will tend to evaluate the
popular alternative in that group (Alt. 1) more positively than the popular alternative in
the other group (Alt. 2). The converse happens for members of Group B.
Prior explanations for the polarization of attitudes across groups have generally
invoked some form of motivated cognition: people subconsciously change their preferences
to diverge from the attitudes of unwanted groups (e.g., Bryson, 1996) while they strive to
adopt attitudes that are similar to the attitudes prevailing in their groups, at least in part
because attitude similarity leads to liking (Clore, 1976). Our model does not require that
observing the choices of members of the wanted and unwanted groups have such a direct
impact on attitudes. It only requires a change in sampling behavior. Our analysis
demonstrates that this change in sampling behavior will have an indirect systematic e ect
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on attitudes. For example, a teenager may have a more or less neutral opinion about some
music genre. When hearing that his parents like this music, he does not directly change his
opinion. He avoids listening to such music, however, because he feels that if he is seen
listening to such music he would appear uncool. Our model implies that such avoidance in
behavior, which is not necessarily driven by a personal negative evaluation of the music,
will lead to systematic di erences in evaluations. More generally, our model shows that the
choice of activities influences exposure and learning opportunities, and this creates a
systematic evaluative bias against the alternative chosen by most people in the out-group.
This, in turn, leads to an evaluative advantage for the alternative popular in the in-group
as compared to the alternative that is popular in the out-group.
Discussion & conclusion
In this paper, we showed that when the social environment makes people more likely
to sample a particular alternative, people tend to evaluate it more positively without this
environmental influence. This occurs when the social environment and the current
evaluation are substitutes in the sense that the social environment a ects sampling more
strongly if the evaluation of the alternative is low rather than high.
To apply this insight to the e ect of popularity on evaluations, we noted that in
many settings, people are more likely to sample popular alternatives than unpopular
alternatives. We also noted that popularity and quality estimates are often substitutes:
even if people have a negative evaluation of an alternative, they might select it again if it is
su ciently popular. We found evidence for such an interaction between popularity and
evaluations in analyses of the repeat purchase behavior of hotel customers.
Our results do not rely on the fact that people are more likely to choose popular
alternatives consciously, but rather that they are more likely to sample popular
alternatives. Our mechanism thus applies to settings where payo  information is more
accessible for more popular alternatives even if popularity does not a ect choices directly.
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This can be the case when the decision maker’s friends or colleagues are more likely to have
experiences with popular alternatives (and share them), or because information about the
experiences of others is more easily available through information channels such as the
press, online forums or review websites. Our model is thus relevant to settings where the
decision maker learns not only from her personal experiences with the alternatives but also
from the experiences of others, provided that there is greater access to payo  information
for popular alternatives.
Because it focuses on access to information rather than on information processing,
our theory does not challenge existing explanations that rely on information processing
biases (i.e., motivated cognition), or inferences about quality on the basis of popularity. It
provides a complementary perspective to explaining the e ect of popularity on evaluations
and attitudes. Finally, we note that our theory also applies to settings where the
availability of payo  information is influenced by environmental factors other than
popularity, such as getting an award (Kovács & Sharkey, 2014), or changes in prices, or
non-random ordering of options on websites (Le Mens et al., 2018).
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Figure 1 . Simulation in which – (qˆk,t, ﬁk) = eqˆk,t+ﬁk and for which condition i) in Theorem
1 holds. Left panel: E[Qˆ1,t] as a function of time: quality estimates decline as a result of
the hot-stove e ect but the decline is less when ﬁ1 is large. Right panel: E[Qˆ1,t]≠ E[Qˆ2,t]
as a function of time: if the inferior Alternative 1 is su ciently popular, learners come to
believe it has the higher quality. Based on 105 simulations with µ1 = 2, µ2 = 2.5, ﬁ2 = 5,
‡ = 2, b = .5, and – (qˆk,t, ﬁk) = eqˆk,t+ﬁk .
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Figure 2 . Simulation in which – (qˆk,t, ﬁk) = eqˆk,t+ﬁk+2qˆk,tﬁk , for which condition ii) in
Theorem 1 holds, and popularity and quality estimates are ‘strong complements’. Left
panel: E[Qˆ1,t] as a function of time: quality estimates decline as a result of the hot-stove
e ect and here the decline is larger when ﬁ1 is large. Right panel: E[Qˆ1,t]≠ E[Qˆ2,t] as a
function of time: if the inferior Alternative 1 is popular, learners come to believe it has
even lower quality. Based on 105 simulations with µ1 = 2, µ2 = 2.5, ﬁ2 = 5, ‡ = 2, b = .5,
and – (qˆk,t, ﬁk) = eqˆk,t+ﬁk+2qˆk,tﬁk .
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Figure 3 . The expected asymptotic quality estimate E[Qˆ1] increases with ﬁ1. By contrast,
E[Qˆ2] decreases with ﬁ1. Figure obtained by plotting eq. 4 with µ1 = 2, µ2 = 2.5, ﬁ2 = 5,
‡ = 2, b = .5 and s = 1.
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Appendix
Proofs of the theorems
Preliminaries
In order to keep notations as simple as possible, we derive the results for the case
where there are just 2 alternatives. The extension to the case where there are K > 2
alternatives is straightforward. In what follows, k is such that k œ {1, 2}.
Under some mild regularity conditions,
1
Qˆ1,t, Qˆ2,t
2
tØ1 defines a Harris chain that is
positive recurrent (Meyn & Tweedie (1993)).6 This implies that the process has a unique
stationary distribution hﬁ1,ﬁ2(·, ·).
Le us define Ÿk,t(r, x), the probability density of the event that Qˆk,t transitions from r
at the beginning of period t to x at the beginning of period t+ 1 given that the decision
maker samples Alternative k in period t. The function Ÿk,t(·, ·) is a transition kernel that
(possibly) changes in every period. In what follows, we assume that the sequence of
functions {Ÿk,t(·, ·)}tØ1 has a limit. Let Ÿk(·, ·) denote the transition kernel Ÿk,t(·, ·)
converges to.
Let density gk(·) denote the density that is stable by application of this transition
kernel. That is, gk satisfies the following equality
ˆ
r
gk(r)Ÿk(r, x)dr = gk(x). (6)
Under some mild regularity conditions, gk(·) is well defined.7 Let µk denote the
6The conditions of positive recurrence are easily verified for the setups where payo s are normally dis-
tributed, the choice rule is the exponential version of Luce choice rule and the weight of new evidence is
constant. They also hold for other setups, such as when the payo  distribution follows uniform or Bernoulli
distributions and the weight of new evidence remains constant. Problematic settings include configurations
where bt converges quickly to 0 as t becomes large.
7Consider a modified model in which Alternative k is sampled in every period. In that case, the se-
quence of random variables
1
Qˆ1,t
2
tØ1
defines a martingale sequence of random variables. We have that if
suptØ1E
Ë---Qˆk,t---È < Œ), then 1Qˆk,t2
tØ1
converges to a random variable with probability 1 (see Billingsley,
1995, p. 468). This limiting random variable has distribution gk(·).
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expected value of gk. Next, we specify the stationary joint density of quality estimates.
Lemma 2. The stationary joint density of
1
Qˆ1, Qˆ2
2
is
hﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1, qˆ2) = K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)
A
1
– (qˆ1, ﬁ1)
+ 1
– (qˆ2, ﬁ2)
B
g1(qˆ1)g2(qˆ2), (7)
where, K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2) is a normalizing constant equal to (A1(ﬁ1) + A2(ﬁ2))≠1, and for k=1,2
Ak(ﬁk) =
ˆ
qˆk
1
– (qˆk, ﬁk)
gk(qˆk)dqˆk. (8)
Proof. To show that hﬁ1,ﬁ2(·, ·) has the proposed form, we need to show (1) that its integral
with respect to (qˆ1, qˆ2) is equal to 1 and (2) that it is stationary. Condition (1) is trivially
verified. Verifying condition (2) requires more work.
The Harris chain has a unique stationary distribution. To prove that the distribution
defined in eq. 7 is the stationary distribution, it is thus enough to prove that it satisfies the
following stability equation:
hﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1, qˆ2) =
ˆ
r1
hﬁ1,ﬁ2 (r1, qˆ2) pS1(r1, qˆ2)Ÿ1(r1, qˆ1)dr1
+
ˆ
r2
hﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1, r2) pS2(qˆ1, r2)Ÿ2(r2, qˆ2)dr2. (9)
Cumbersome but straightforward calculations show that this equality holds - See
Supplementary Material for details.
Proof of Theorem 1
i. We begin by computing the marginal density of Qˆ1. It is obtained by integrating the
joint density hﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1, qˆ2) over qˆ2. The marginal density of Qˆ1 is denoted by h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (·) and
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is equal to
h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1) =
ˆ
Qˆ2
hﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1, qˆ2) dqˆ2,
=
ˆ
Qˆ2
K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)
A
1
– (qˆ1, ﬁ1)
+ 1
– (qˆ2, ﬁ2)
B
g1(qˆ1)g2(qˆ2)dqˆ2,
= K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)
1
– (qˆ1, ﬁ1)
g1(qˆ1)
+K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)
Aˆ
Qˆ2
1
– (qˆ2, ﬁ2)
g2(qˆ2)dqˆ2
B
g1(qˆ1),
= K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)
A
1
– (qˆ1, ﬁ1)
+ A2(ﬁ2)
B
g1(qˆ1).
If the density h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1) is log-supermodular with respect to ﬁ1 and qˆ1, it possesses the
monotone likelihood ratio property. This, in turn, implies that Qˆ1 is stochastically
increasing in ﬁ1 and that, in particular, E[Qˆ1] is non-decreasing in ﬁ1 (Karlin & Rinott,
1980). If h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1) is twice continuously di erentiable with respect to ﬁ1 and qˆ1, a simple
way to check that h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1) is log-supermodular is to verify that
ˆ2 log h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1)
ˆﬁ1ˆqˆ1
Ø 0, (10)
(e.g., Karlin & Rubin, 1956, p. 639).
We have
ˆ2 log h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1)
ˆﬁ1ˆqˆ1
= ˆ
2 logK(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)
ˆﬁ1ˆqˆ1
+
ˆ2 log
1
1
–(qˆ1,ﬁ1) + A2(ﬁ2)
2
ˆﬁ1ˆqˆ1
+ ˆ
2 log g1(qˆ1)
ˆﬁ1ˆqˆ1
.
The first and third term are equal to 0. This implies that h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1) is log-supermodular i 
ˆ2 log
1
1
–(qˆ1,ﬁ1) + A2(ﬁ2)
2
ˆﬁ1ˆqˆ1
Ø 0. (11)
In what follows, we denote by –(1,0)(·, ·) the first derivative of –(·, ·) with respect to its first
argument. Similarly, –(1,1)(·, ·) denotes the cross derivative of –(·, ·); and more generally
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–(k,l)(·, ·) denotes the multiple derivative of –(·, ·) obtained by di erentiating –(·, ·)
successively k times with respect to its first argument and l times with respect to its
second argument. Some algebra shows that the inequality in eq. 11 is satisfied i 
[1 + 2A2(ﬁ2)– (qˆ1, ﬁ1)]–(1,0) (qˆ1, ﬁ1)–(0,1) (qˆ1, ﬁ1)
≠ [1 + A2(ﬁ2)– (qˆ1, ﬁ1)]–(1,1) (qˆ1, ﬁ1)– (qˆ1, ﬁ1) Ø 0. (12)
We assumed that
ˆ2 log– (qˆ1, ﬁ1)
ˆﬁ1ˆqˆ1
Æ 0.
This condition is equivalent to
–(1,0) (qˆ1, ﬁ1)–(0,1) (qˆ1, ﬁ1)≠ – (qˆ1, ﬁ1)–(1,1) (qˆ1, ﬁ1) Ø 0. (13)
Let us denote by Ci the LHS of the above equation. By assumption, Ci Ø 0.
With this notation, the inequality in eq. 12 can be rewritten as
A2(ﬁ2)– (qˆ1, ﬁ1)–(1,0) (qˆ1, ﬁ1)–(0,1) (qˆ1, ﬁ1) + (1 + A2(ﬁ2)– (qˆ1, ﬁ1))Ci Ø 0. (14)
The fact that A2(ﬁ2) > 0 and the assumptions that – (·, ·) is positive and non-decreasing in
its two arguments imply that all the terms of the LHS of eq. 14 are non-negative. That is,
the inequality in eq. 11 holds. This implies that h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1) is log-supermodular with respect
to ﬁ1 and qˆ1. In turn, qˆ1 is stochastically increasing in ﬁ1, and E[Qˆ1] is non decreasing in
ﬁ1. QED
ii. If the density h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1) is log-submodular (as opposed to log-supermodular) with
respect to ﬁ1 and qˆ1, then qˆ1 is stochastically decreasing in ﬁ1 and, in particular, E[Qˆ1] is
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non-increasing in ﬁ1 (Karlin & Rinott, 1980). h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1) is log-submodular if
ˆ2 log h1ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1)
ˆﬁ1ˆqˆ1
Æ 0, (15)
which can be expanded similarly as eq. 12 (the LHS remains the same but the inequality
sign becomes ‘Æ’).
The assumption that ˆ
2 1
–(qˆ1,ﬁ1)
ˆﬁ1ˆqˆ1
Æ 0, is equivalent to
2–(1,0) (qˆ1, ﬁ1)–(0,1) (qˆ1, ﬁ1)≠ – (qˆ1, ﬁ1)–(1,1) (qˆ1, ﬁ1) Æ 0.
Let us denote by Cii the LHS of the above equation. We have Cii Æ 0.
With this notation, inequality 15 can be rewritten as
(1 + A2(ﬁ2)– (qˆ1, ﬁ1))Cii ≠ –(1,0) (qˆ1, ﬁ1)–(0,1)(qˆ1, ﬁ1) Æ 0 (16)
The assumption that Cii Æ 0, the fact that A2(ﬁ2) > 0 and the assumptions that – (·, ·)
positive and is increasing in its two arguments imply LHS of eq. 16 is non-positive.
Therefore, inequality 15 holds. This implies that hqˆ11ﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1) is log-submodular with respect
to ﬁ1 and qˆ1. Therefore, Qˆ1 is stochastically decreasing in ﬁ1, and E[Qˆ1] is non-increasing
in ﬁ1. QED
Proof of Lemma 1
First note that Lemma 2 applied to this special case implies that the stationary joint
density of
1
Qˆ1, Qˆ2
2
is
hﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1, qˆ2) = e
≠ s2‡2b2(2≠b) e
≠sqˆ1≠ﬁ1 + e≠sqˆ2≠ﬁ2
e≠sµ1≠ﬁ1 + e≠sµ2≠ﬁ2 g1(qˆ1)g2(qˆ2), (17)
where, for k œ {1, 2}, gk(·) is a normal density with mean µk and variance ‡2b/(2≠ b).
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E[Qˆ1] is obtained by double integration of qˆ1hﬁ1ﬁ2 (qˆ1, qˆ2) with respect to qˆ1 and qˆ2 (these
are cumbersome but straightforward algebraic manipulations – see the Supplementary
Material for Details). QED
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Additional Details for the proofs
Proof of the equality in eq. 7 in the proof of Lemma 2.
To explain eq. 7, consider the first term.
RHS1=ˆ
ˆ
r1
hﬁ1,ﬁ2 (r1, qˆ2) pS1(r1, qˆ2)Ÿ1(r1, qˆ1)dr1. (1)
This is the probability that the decision maker has estimates equal to r1 and qˆ2, that she
samples the first alternative, and that her quality estimate goes from r1 to qˆ1 which
happens with probability Ÿ1(r1, qˆ1). We integrate over all possible estimates about the first
alternative. The second term has a similar structure.
To show that the above joint density in Lemma 2 does satisfy the stability equation (eq. 7
in the Appendix) note first that pS1(r1, qˆ2) can be written as follows
pS1(r1, qˆ2) =
–≠1 (qˆ2, ﬁ2)
–≠1 (r1, ﬁ1) + –≠1 (qˆ2, ﬁ2)
. (2)
Using this and the formula for the joint density (eq. 5 in the Appendix) to perform the
appropriate substitutions in eq. ??, we get:
RHS1 = K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)
ˆ
r1
–≠1 (qˆ2, ﬁ2) g1(r1)g2(qˆ2)Ÿ1(r1, qˆ1)dr1,
= K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)–≠1 (qˆ2, ﬁ2) g2(qˆ2)
ˆ
r1
g1(r1)Ÿ1(r1, qˆ1)dr1,
= K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)–≠1 (qˆ2, ﬁ2) g2(qˆ2)g1(qˆ1).
The last equality is a consequence of the equality in eq. 4 in the Appendix (after a simple
change of variable in the integral).
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Similarly, for the second term in the RHS of the stability equation, we get:
ˆ
r2
hﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1, r2) pS2(qˆ1, r2)Ÿ2(r2, qˆ2)dr2 = K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)–≠1 (qˆ1, ﬁ1) g1(qˆ1)g2(qˆ2).
Summing the two terms, the RHS of eq. 7 in the Appendix becomes equal to
K(ﬁ1, ﬁ2)
1
–≠1 (qˆ1, ﬁ1) + –≠1 (qˆ2, ﬁ2)
2
g1(qˆ1)g2(qˆ2),
which is hﬁ1,ﬁ2 (qˆ1, qˆ2), the stationary distribution.
Details for the proof of Lemma 1.
The double integration of qˆ1hﬁ1ﬁ2 (qˆ1, qˆ2) with respect to qˆ1 and qˆ2 yields:
E[Qˆ1] =
e≠
s2‡2b
2(2≠b)
e≠sµ1≠ﬁ1 + e≠sµ2≠ﬁ2 e
≠ﬁ1
ˆ
qˆ1
qˆ1e
≠sqˆ1g1(qˆ1)dqˆ1
+ e
≠ s2‡2b2(2≠b)
e≠sµ1≠ﬁ1 + e≠sµ2≠ﬁ2 µ1e
≠ﬁ2
ˆ
qˆ2
e≠sqˆ2g2(qˆ2)dqˆ2.
Noting that
´
qˆ2
e≠sqˆ2g2(qˆ2)dqˆ2 is the moment generating function of the distribution g2(·),
evaluated at ≠s, we have:
´
qˆ2
e≠sqˆ2g2(qˆ2)dqˆ2 = e≠sµ2+
s2‡2b
2(2≠b) .
Some algebraic manipulations yield:
ˆ
qˆ1
qˆ1e
≠sqˆ1g1(qˆ1)dqˆ1 = e≠sµ1+
s2‡2b
2(2≠b)
A
µ1 ≠ sb2≠ b‡
2
B
.
Summing up the terms, we obtain the desired formula for E[Qˆ1] (eq. 3 in the body of the
paper).
INFORMATION SAMPLING, JUDGMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 4
Sensitivity of the Predictions to Model Parameters
The amplitude of the sampling bias is moderated by how the environment parameters
relate to each other. To see how, it is useful to consider extreme cases. Suppose, for
example, that ﬁ1 ∫ ﬁ2. In this case, the decision maker will sample Alternative 1 almost
no matter what her quality estimates are. There is thus almost no sampling bias for this
alternative, the quality estimate is close to the true quality and there is almost no
underestimation tendency for this alternative. When ﬁ1 π ﬁ2, sampling depends more
strongly on quality estimates. The quality estimate is thus subject to the systematic
underestimation tendency described above. These additional predictions are formalized in
the following corollary to Lemma 1 that deals with what happens when the two
alternatives have very di erent popularities.
Corollary 1. i) When Alternative 1 is much more popular than Alternative 2, (ﬁ1 ∫ ﬁ2),
E[Qˆ1] ≥ µ1. (3)
ii) When Alternative 1 is much less popular than Alternative 2 (ﬁ1 π ﬁ2),
E[Qˆ1] ≥ µ1 ≠ sb2≠ b‡
2 < µ1. (4)
The same holds for Alternative 2.
Variance of the Observations
When the variance of the observations is low (‡2 ≥ 0), the environment has little to
no e ect on quality assessments. Similarly, the decision maker is unlikely to mistakenly
believe the inferior alternative to be better than the superior alternative. Like other
sampling explanations of judgment biases, our mechanism requires the possibility of
making estimation mistakes (e.g., Denrell, 2005; Denrell & Le Mens, 2007, 2011; Fazio et
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al., 2004). This is the pattern of error corrections that leads to systematic judgment
patterns and biases. If the variance of the observations is low, even few observations will
lead to accurate estimates, and no mistake will emerge. This implies that our information
sampling mechanism will not operate in such conditions.
Reinforcement learning structure of the sampling process
If the sampling likelihood is not sensitive to the quality of past experiences,
systematic errors are unlikely to emerge. This is the case when the sensitivity of the
sampling likelihood to quality estimates is low (s is low) or when the weight of new
observations is low (b is close to 0). This is because the emergence of the positive e ect of
the environment on quality assessments relies on the fact that decision makers have a
systematic tendency to underestimate the qualities of the alternatives. This occurs because
of the increased likelihood to sample an alternative again following positive experiences
with that alternative. When s or b is low, such adaptive resampling hardly occurs. This
implies, in turn, that systematic underestimation does not emerge and thus that popular
and unpopular alternatives are equally likely to be underestimated.
We have assumed so far that the sampling likelihood is increasing both in the quality
estimate and in the environment factor ﬁk. It is worth noting that our formal results
remain similar when the sampling likelihood is decreasing in ﬁk while it is increasing in the
quality estimate (e.g., Lieberson, 2000). To see what our model predicts in this case, it is
enough to consider the same formulas, but by putting a ‘minus’ sign in front of ﬁ1 and ﬁ2.
For example, equation 3 in the body of the paper becomes:
E[Qˆ1] = µ1 ≠ sb2≠ b‡
2 e
≠sµ1
e≠sµ1 + e≠ﬁ1+ﬁ2e≠sµ2 < µ1. (5)
In the section of empirical implications, we build on these insights and analyze a
model where the sampling likelihood is increasing in the popularity of the alternative in the
group of the decision maker while it is decreasing in its popularity in another group. We
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show that such a model leads to a polarization of attitudes across groups.
We could similarly adapt our model to cases where the sampling likelihood is
decreasing with the quality estimate. To see what happens in this case, it is enough to
replace s by ≠s in all the formulas. In this case, decision makers have a tendency to
overestimate (rather than underestimate) the qualities of the available alternatives. The
e ect of popularity on quality estimates is negative if the sampling likelihood is increasing
with popularity1, and it is positive if the sampling likelihood is decreasing with popularity.2
Although there are fewer settings where people have an elevated tendency to sample
alternatives that lead to poor payo s than settings where people have an elevated tendency
to sample again alternatives that lead to positive payo s, this can happen for example
when a journalist tries to uncover stories about unethical or unlawful behavior, or when a
wine critique decides to taste again a wine that she found underperforming with respect to
her expectations (Laube, 2007).
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